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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear income and inheritance taxation by incorporating
two types of models that were developed independently in the public finance literature: an
infinite horizon representative agent model such as Judd (1995), Chamley (1986) and Lucas
(1992), and asymmetric information model analyzed by Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1982).
In this paper, by using an infinite horizon model with heterogenous agents and quasi-linear
preference under an asymmetric information environment we characterize optimal income
and inheritance taxation. This paper shows that, contrary to the general perception that
inheritance taxation should be progressive to some extent, the expected tax liability of those
who have a higher level of assets is lower than the expected tax liability of those who have a
lower level of assets. Thus, the optimal inheritance tax is regressive.
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1 Introduction
Inheritance taxation is one of the most controversial issues in modern economic policy. Conser-
vatives often argue that inheritance taxes discourage saving, entrepreneurial activity and labor
supply and that they have large negative effects on the size of economic output and its growth.
Liberals argue that those taxes are necessary to put people on the same start line, to reduce
income inequality and to decrease the concentration of wealth. In addition, sometimes it is ar-
gued that such redistributive taxes work as social insurance if we consider being rich or poor
as idiosyncratic shocks (Varian 1980). Furthermore, a recent increase of inequality of wealth
distribution in the US accelerated the policy debate on the effect of inheritance taxes (Gale et
al. 2000).
According to the Survey of Consumer Finance in 1995 (Wolf 2000), the top 1% of families
(as ranked by marketable wealth) own 45% of total household financial wealth and the top 20%
own 92 % of the marketable financial wealth. The average financial wealth is $7,000,000 for the
top 1% while the average financial wealth of the population is $155,000. In addition, half of the
top 1% receive an inheritance whose average value is $800,000 while 20% of the total population
receive an inheritance whose value is $96,000. This implies that the rich are already richer at
the beginning than the average population. Thus, on wealth inequality and the transmission of
wealth, the argument of the liberals is not groundless. However, those top 1% rich are also very
productive people. According to the same data, among the top 1% rich, 69% are self-employed
while only 17% are so among the total population. 40% of the top 1% go to graduate school
while among the total population only 11% do so. Hence, it is also quite possible that the
top 1% are knowledgeable entrepreneurs and their wealth is the reward for their entrepreneurial
activity as the conservative argue. Given the fact that half of the top 1% receive inheritance, it is
not surprising that inheritance taxes affect incentive for entrepreneurial activity due to business
owner’s incentive to leave their business to their family members. In such a case, inheritance
taxes can have large negative effect on the economy. 1
Given those arguments, it is interesting to look at how the previous public finance literature
treated the issue of inheritance taxation. There are several papers that should be discussed in
such a context. In seminal papers, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) showed that in an infinite
horizon representative agent model, the constrained Pareto-efficient tax rate on capital income
should be zero at the steady state and that there should be no intertemporal distortion at the
steady state. In a static analysis with heterogenous agent, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1975) showed
1For other statistics, the top 1% of families (as ranked by marketable wealth) owned 36% of the total household
wealth and the top 20% percent of households owned 84% of it. The total wealth is the financial wealth plus the
net equity of owner occupied housing and automobiles.
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that if leisure is weakly separable with consumptions in different periods, then an intertemporal
distortion is not optimal by using a framework developed by Mirrlees (1971). Since inheritance
taxes can be interpreted as one form of intertemporal distortion, those results suggest that the
government should not use inheritance taxation.
However, the previous literature is limited in several ways. First, the representative agent
model does not seem to be appealing when we need to discuss redistribution of wealth from those
who have to those who do not have. Second, the assumption on the weak separability between
consumption and labor supply is useful only when labor is supplied in the first period. The result
of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1975,1980) does not hold when labor is supplied in multiple periods.
Third, the two period overlapping generation model is limited in the analysis of capital income
taxation. In the public finance literature, Summers (1981) showed that using the two period
overlapping generation model is misleading for the analysis of capital income taxation because
the two period overlapping generation model does not capture the income effect for the future
income that is caused by a change of discount rate. Fourth, the literature ignores the important
fact that the transfer of assets between generations is also accompanied by intangible assets such
as knowledge on management. If it is so, discouraging to continue business might imply a large
social welfare loss.
In this paper, we examine the issue of inheritance taxation in an infinite horizon model with
heterogenous agents, asymmetric information and quasi-linear preference (linear in labor supply).
We assume an infinite horizon model given that the substantial size of inheritance among the rich
exists in reality. It seems difficult to explain those observed inheritances among the rich by the
accidental bequest model. Also using a heterogenous model is needed to discuss redistribution of
the unequal wealth distribution. We use quasi-linear preference assumption to make the analysis
under the environment of asymmetric information tractable. 2
In this paper, we first characterize the optimal income and inheritance tax system and show
that in the environment of asymmetric information and quasi-linear preference the tax liability
of those who have a higher level of capital is on average lower than those who have a lower level
of capital, contrary to the general perception that the inheritance should be progressive to some
extent.
In the public finance literature, to our knowledge there are two papers that are close to
our analysis: Pirttila and Tuomala (2001) Boadway, Merchand and Pestieau (2000). Pirttila
and Tuomala analyzed capital income taxation under nonlinear income tax in an OLG model.
Boadway et al. analyzed capital income taxation with nonlinear income tax and accidental
2In the mechanism design literature, the quasi-linear preference is assumed in many cases for tractability. See
Fudenberg and Tirole (1993).
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bequest. But neither of the papers analyzed the capital income taxation in a dynastic framework
where the amount of investment depends on the structure of income taxes in the future.
Methodologically, this paper borrows an approach used in a dynamic contract theory such
as Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreau, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), which showed that
by using the future’s expected discounted utility as state variables many interesting dynamic
contracts can be analyzed in a tractable way.
2 The model
2.1 Set up
In this economy, time is infinite. Before period 1, there are 2 types of agents denoted by index H
and index L. Type H has a higher level of capital KH and type L has a lower level of capital KL.
Types of capital is observable and verifiable to a social planner. Then, at the beginning of period
1, type H and type L agents turn out to be skilled workers or unskilled workers. This implies
that at the middle of each period, there are four types of workers, Hs,Hu,Ls, Lu. Throughout
this paper, we use an index i to indicate capital types(i = H,L) and indices j and m (m 6= j) to
indicate labor types (j,m = s, u). We assume that the probability that an agent becomes skilled
or unskilled is i.i.d. and it does not depend on his past history or past labor supply. We also
assume that the skilled worker is θs/θu times productive than unskilled workers (θs > θu). We
denote the population of type ij(i = H,L and j = s, u) at period t by nijt . The type ij agent
supplies lijt units of labor and earns z
ij
t = θjwl
ij
t units of labor income and FkK
i units of capital
income where w and Fk is the marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital,
respectively. A production function F (·) has two arguments (capital and labor) and exhibits
constant returns to scale. Given type ij’s capital income and labor income, the social planner
determines his tax liability. We assume that the tax liability of each agent does not depend on
information of their parents due to the social planner’s concern about equity. Once after tax
income is determined, the agent decides how much to invest for future and how much to consume
for today. Each agent has a dynastic utility function:
v1 = u(c1)− l1 + E1[
∞∑
t=1
γt{u(ct+1)− lt+1]}
where ct and lt are consumption and labor supply at period t and u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) < 0. αj
is the probability to become type j (j = s, u) worker and αs + αu = 1. We assume that ct and
lt take any value on the real number. This implies that there is no corner solution for lt and ct
at the optimum. We assume that one generation lives for only one period. Thus, we interpret γ
as a parameter exhibiting a degree of altruism. At the end of each period, each agent makes a
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consumption and investment decision. Because each agent lives for one period, we assume that
the agent cannot borrow money using children’s future income as collateral. At the end of period
t, given after tax income xit for agent i he decides how much to invest out of his after tax income.
At the beginning of the period t+1, some investment will succeed and some investments will fail.
As a result, some agents will receive a high level of capital KH becoming type H and other agents
will receive KL becoming type L. We assume that the amount of investment is not observable
to the social planner. Thus, there is a moral hazard problem regarding investment. We assume
that given type ij’s investment Iijt , the probability of his child receiving K
H at period t + 1 is
pi(I
ij
t ) and
(A1) pH(I
ij
t ) ≥ pL(Iijt )
This implies that the probability of successfully leaving capital to his/her child for those who
have a high level of capital is higher than for those who have a low level of capital. This can be so
because of the effect of intangible assets and reputation of conducting business. The assumption
(A1) means that whether the agent can leave his business successfully to his child does not depend
on the agent’s genetic ability once it is conditioned by the agent’s investment. In other words,
other than physical investment, there is no factor that causes intergenerational transmission of
wealth inequality. After receiving capital at the beginning of period t+ 1, the child again turns
out to be a skilled worker or an unskilled worker and the same game will be repeated.
The social planner’s objective is to maximize the social welfare function evaluated at t = 1 with
the intertemporal government budget constraint. Thus, given an initial population distribution
{nH1 , nL1 }, the social planner solves the following problem:
Primary program
max
{vH1 , vL1 }
Ψ(vH1 , v
L
1 )
s.t. E(vL1 , v
H
1 ;n
L
1 , n
H
1 ) ≤ A
where Ψ(·) is a social welfare function for the social planner. It is concave and strictly increasing
with respect to its arguments. E(vH1 , v
L
1 ; , n
H
1 , n
L
1 ) is the expenditure function and it is the
additionally necessary resource to achieve a lifetime utility vi1 for each i agent when the population
of type i is ni1. The above Primary Program says that the social planner will choose v
i
1 for each i
to maximize his social welfare with the constraint that the additionally necessary cost to achieve
a life time utility vi1 for each i is less than A. We normally set A to zero. For the analysis, define
W ij(x, vHt+1, v
L
t+1) as follows:
W ij(x, vHt+1, v
L
t+1) ≡ max{I} u(x − I) + γpi(I)v
H
t+1 + γ(1− pi(I))vLt+1
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W ij(x, vHt+1, v
L
t+1) is the sub-indirect utility when the type ij agent receives after tax income x and
the optimal investment is chosen. Given this individual optimization problem, since investment
I is a function of x, vHt+1 and v
L
t+1, we can write it as I(x, v
H
t+1, v
L
t+1).
Then, the expenditure function, E(·) is defined recursively as follows:
Sub-program
E(vLt , v
H
t ;n
L
t , n
H
t ) = min
{cij ,,Iijt ,vjt :j=1,2,...,J}
Q(bt) + γE(vLt+1, v
H
t+1;n
L
t+1, n
H
t+1)
s.t.
∑
j=s,u
αj{W ij(xijt , vHt+1, vLt+1)− lijt } − vit = 0 for i = H,L (PUi)
W ij(xijt , v
H
t+1, v
L
t+1)− lijt ≥W ij(ximt , vHt+1, vLt+1)−
θm
θj
limt for i = H,L ;j,m = s, u and m 6= j
(ICij)
bt +
∑
i=H,L;
∑
j=s,u
αjnijt K
i(1 +R) +
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
nitα
jlijt wθ
j ≥
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
nitα
jxijt (RC)
nHt+1 =
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
αjpi(Iij(x
ij
t , v
H
t+1, v
L
t+1))N
i
t (TRNH)
nLt+1 =
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
αj [1− pi(Iij(xijt , vHt+1, vLt+1))]nit (TRNL)
Iij(x, vht+1, v
l
t+1) = argmax u(x − I) + γpi(I)vht+1 + γ(1− pi(I))vlt+1
t = 0, 1, 2, ...;
where Q(bt) is a penalty function from lending. We assume that Q(bt) = bt for bt < 0 and
Q(bt) = δG(bt) for bt where δ > 0,G(bt) ≥ Bt, G′(bt) > 1 and G′′(bt) > 0.
The above two programming problems deserve several comments. First, we consider the
problem of the social planner in two steps. First the social planner chooses vi1 for each i to
maximize his social welfare function with the total discounted resource constraint. Then, given
those chosen vi1 for each i, the social planner will choose x
ij
t for all i and t to minimize the
discounted resource cost to achieve vi1 for each i. Second, Q(bt) is a function that captures
the social planner’s accessibility to international capital market (openness of the economy). For
example, if this economy is closed, we can obtain the solution by setting δ at quite a large number.
If Q(bt) is equal to bt for all bt, it means that the economy is open for the social planner and
the social planner can lend and borrow at the same price. Third, (PUi) is the promised utility
constraint. It says that for those who have Ki level of capital, the expected utility from today
must be equal to vit for each i. Summarizing the effect of all policies in the future in v
j
t+1, we
can design today’s tax policies when the agents’ behavior also depends on tax policies in the
future. (ICis) is the incentive compatibility constraint for those who have Ki level of capital and
who are skilled workers. Because of the hidden types assumption, at each period t, the social
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planner cannot know whether an agent is a skilled worker or an unskilled worker. Therefore, the
tax system must be designed so that each type self-selects an allocation that the social planner
intended. The constraint says that the type ij worker has an incentive to announce that he is
type j worker, to work lijt hours, to earn z
ij
t ≡ wθjlij dollars and to receive xijt units of income
rather than to announce that he is type m worker, to work w
m
wj
limt hours, to earn z
im
t ≡ wθmlimt
units of income and to receive ximt units of income. (RC) is the resource constraint for the
social planner. Definition of I(xijt , v
H
t+1, v
L
t+1) requires that the investment is consistent with
intertemporal maximization.
2.2 Analysis
Before analyzing the case with incentive problems, it would be useful to know the first best case
where the social planner can control xijt and I
ij
t perfectly. In this case, it is straightforward to
show that at the steady state (i) the consumption levels are equal for all types of agents (ii) the
investment levels of all types of agents are equal (iii) the first order condition of the investment
implies that P ′(Iij) × Fk × (KH − KL) = 1/γ where Fk is the marginal product of capital.
Thus, at the first best solution, the consumption is perfectly smoothed for all types of agents and
investment is made so that the expected marginal product of investment is equal to the discount
rate.
Now consider the second best situation where the social planner cannot observe individual
labor types and investment but can observe earned income, which was initially analyzed by
Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1982). In this case, the social planner will use a nonlinear income
tax system to distinguish skilled workers from unskilled workers. The social planner will give and
require a higher consumption level and higher labor supply to those who announced that they
are skilled and will give a lower consumption level and lower labor supply to those who announce
that they are unskilled.
Let µt, λit and φ
ij
t , be the Lagrangian multipliers of RC, PUi and ICij of the sub-program,
respectively. Then, the first-order conditions for xijt , l
ij
t are
Bt : Q′(bt) + µt = 0.
xijt : λ
i
tα
j ∂W
ij
∂xijt
+ φij
∂W ij
∂xijt
− φim∂W
im
∂xijt
− µtniαj + ∂I
∂xijt
p′i(I
ij)nitα
j
{
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
}
= 0
lijt : −αjλit − φijt + φim
θi
θm
+ µtniαjθjw = 0
i = H,L ;j,m = s, u and j 6= m
As for the FOC of vit+1 and the population transition equation, it would be useful to write in
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matrix form:(
λHt+1
λLt+1
)
=
( ∑
j α
jpH(I
Hj
t )
∑
j α
jpL(I
Lj
t )∑
j α
j(1− pH(IHjt ))
∑
j α
j(1− pL(ILjt ))
)(
λHt
λLt
)
+
(
ϕt
−ϕt
)
(1)(
nHt+1
nLt+1
)
=
( ∑
j α
jpH(I
Hj
t )
∑
j α
jpL(I
Lj
t )∑
j α
j(1− pH(IHjt ))
∑
j α
j(1− pL(ILjt ))
)(
nHt
nLt
)
(2)
where ϕt =
∑
j=s,u
∑
i=H,L
φij(pi(I
ij
t )− pi(Îij,mt )) +
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
∂Iij
∂vHt+1
p′i(I
ij
t )n
i
tα
j
{
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
}
,
Iijt = I
ij(xij , vht+1, v
l
t+1), and Î
ij,m
t = I
ij(xim, vht+1, v
l
t+1) (3)
Note that the matrix of the RHS of (2) is the Markov matrix. For the property of the Markov
matrix, see Simon and Blume (1994). From the envelope theorem, ∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
can be calculated
as follows:
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
= µt+1{[FkKH + w
∑
j=s,u
αjlHj −
∑
αjxHj ]− [FkKL + w
∑
j=s,u
αjlLj −
∑
αjxLj ]}
+ γ{αs(p(IHst+1)− pLs(ILst+1)) + αu(p(IHut+1)− p(ILut+1))}{
∂E
∂nHt+2
− ∂E
∂nLt+2
}.
Let FkKi+wl
Hj
t −xijt be T ijt . Since FkKi+wlHjt is the total income of type ij agent and xijt is
after tax income, T ijt can be interpreted as the tax liability of the type ij agent at period t. Thus,∑
j=s,u α
jTHjt −
∑
j=s,u α
jTLjt is the difference of the expected tax liability of type H and type L
agents. In addition, in the steady state, ∂E
∂nHt
− ∂E
∂nLt
= µ∗∆∗ {
∑
j=s,u α
jTHj∗ −
∑
j=s,u α
jTLj∗ } where
∗ indicates variables at the steady state and ∆∗ = [1−γ{αs(pH(IHs∗ )− pL(ILs∗ ))+αu(pH(IHu∗ )−
pL(ILu∗ ))}] > 0. Thus, the sign of ∂E∂nHt −
∂E
∂nLt
will determine the sign of the difference of the
expected tax liability between type H and type L agents at the steady state.
Now we are going to ask whether there should be an inheritance tax in this model. Optimality
of inheritance tax can be interpreted as the difference of the tax liability of type H and type L
agents for the same labor type. We characterize the structure of inheritance tax in the following
steps:
Claim 1 µt and λit are strictly negative.
Proof. Suppose that RC constraint is not binding. Then, by decreasing bt, the social planner
can decrease the cost. Thus, µt is strictly negative. Next we prove that λit is strictly negative.
Suppose that at the optimum, one of (PUi) is not binding. Then, by increasing list and l
iu the
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social planner can decrease bt. Since (RC) is binding, this will decrease the total cost to the social
planner. This is a contradiction. Thus, (PUi) must be binding. 
Claim 2 xist ≥ xiut and zist ≥ ziut
Proof. From the assumption on the utility function, a single crossing property is guaranteed in
a dimension of xijt and z
ij
t . The incentive compatibility constraint and a single crossing property
imply that xist ≥ xiut and zist ≥ ziut for each i = H,L. 
Claim 3 φist is strictly negative.
Suppose that neither ICHs nor ICLs are binding. Then increase list by dl
is and decrease liut
by dliu = (αs/αu)dlis so that the expected utility is the same. On the other hand, the change of
the total labor supply is θsαsdlis+ θuαu((αs/αu)dliu = αs(θs− θu)dlis. Thus, as long as θs > θu,
the social planner can decrease the total cost. This will continue until both ICHs and ICLs bind.

Claim 4 φiut is equal to zero as long as x
is
t > x
iu
t .
Proof. Now we will show that if ICis is binding, then ICiu is automatically satisfied as long
as zist ≥ ziut . Note that from a single crossing property and the ICis and ICiu,xist ≥ xiut implies
zist ≥ ziut . Now suppose that ICis is binding. Then,(xis, zis) and (xiu, ziu) must be on the same
indifference curve of type is. Since zist ≥ ziut ,(xis, zis) is located to the right of (xiu, ziu) or at the
same point of (xiu, ziu). Because of a single crossing property and the shape of the indifference
curve, the indifference curve of type iu crosses any indifference curve of type is once from the
above. This implies that ICiu is also satisfied. 
From this point, we consider a problem that ignores ICHu and ICLu but includes a constraint
xist ≥ xiut . Note that from Claim 2 xist ≥ xiut is a necessary condition from ICis and ICiu under
a single crossing property. Thus, we look for the solution with smaller constraints. After finding
the solution with smaller constraints, we will check that the solution also satisfies ICHu and
ICLu.
Claim 5 λHt /n
H
t = λ
L
t /n
L
t .
Note that we can ignore ICHu and ICLu. Since ICHs and ICLs bind, from the first order
condition of lis and liu,
−λit − φist + µtniαsθsw = 0 for i=H,L
−λit + φis
θu
θs
+ µtniαuθuw = 0 for i=H,L
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Those four equations imply that λHt /n
H
t +φ
Hs/nHt = λ
L
t /n
L
t +φ
Ls/nLt and λ
H
t /n
H
t +(θ
uφHs)/(θsnHt ) =
λLt /n
L
t + (θ
uφLs)/(θsnLt ) . This implies that λ
H
t /n
H
t = λ
L
t /n
L
t . 
Claim 6 ϕt = 0
Proof. Note from the FOC of lij1 , λ
H
1 /n
H
1 = λ
L
1 /n
L
1 at period 1. On the other hand, once
ni1is determined, n
i
2 is determined by equation (TRNH) and (TRNL), and λ
i
2 is determined by
equation (1). Thus, when λHt /n
H
t = λ
L
t /n
L
t for t = 2, ϕt = 0. Extending this logic, it is obvious
that it must be true for all t ≥ 1. 
Claim 7 ∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
≥ 0 for all t
Proof. Note that from Claim 4, φiu{p(Iiut ) − p(Îiu,st )} = 0 for i = H,L. From Claim 6 it
implies that
ϕt =
∑
i=H,L
φij(pi(Iist )− pi(Îis,ut )) +
∑
i=H,L
∑
j=s,u
∂Iij
∂vHt+1
p′i(I
ij
t )n
i
tα
j
{
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
}
= 0
As for the first term, pi(Iist ) − pi(Îis,ut ) > 0 if xist > xiut and pi(Iist ) − pi(Îis,ut ) = 0 if xist = xiut .
Thus, we have ∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
≥ 0 
Claim 8 xist > x
iu
t
Proof. Consider the problem with ICHs, ICLs and xist ≥ xiut . Let τt be the Lagrangian
multiplier of the constraint of xist ≥ xiut where τt ≤ 0. The first order conditions of xis and xiu
of this problem are
λHt α
s∂W
is
∂xis
+ φist
∂W is
∂xis
− µtniαs + ∂I
∂xist
p′i(I
is)nitα
s
{
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
}
+ τt = 0
λitα
u∂W
iu
∂xiu
− φist
∂W is
∂xiu
− µtniαu + ∂I
∂xiut
p′i(I
iu)nitα
u
{
∂E
∂nHt+1
− ∂E
∂nLt+1
}
− τt = 0
It is easy to check that xist = x
iu
t is not compatible with the above first order conditions. Thus,
xist > x
iu
t . 
Note that from Claim 4, ICHu and ICLu are also satisfied. This means that it was appropriate
to ignore ICHu and ICLu. Also, from the argument of Claim 7, we have ∂E
∂nH
− ∂E
∂nL
> 0. This
implies that at the steady state, ∂E
∂nH
− ∂E
∂nL
must be positive. On the other hand, at the steady
state ∂E
∂nH
− ∂E
∂nL
= µ∗∆∗ {
∑
j=s,u α
jTHj∗ −
∑
j=s,u α
jTLj∗ }. Since µ∗ is the Lagrangian multiplier of
the resource constraint at the steady state, µ∗ is strictly negative. This means that the inside of
the bracket must be strictly negative. In other words, the excepted tax liability of those who have
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a higher level of assets is smaller than the tax liability of those who have lower level of assets.
Thus, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The expected tax liability of those who have a high level of capital is lower than
the expected tax liability of those who have a low level of capital.
The Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. When the investment is not observable to
the social planner, but the social planner wants to redistribute income, there is a moral hazard
problem and the incentive for investment is reduced. In order to keep the incentive for the
investment, there must be some difference between the expected utilities of those who have a
high level of capital and those who have a low level of capital. However, the difference between
those expected utilities can be generated by the difference between consumption levels or by the
difference between labor supply levels and the answer depends on the curvature of the utility
function with respect to consumption and labor supply. The idea of the Proposition 1 is that
when the marginal disutility of labor is constant, the difference between vH and vL should be
generated by the difference between labor supply levels. This implies that low level capital owners
needs to work more on average than high level capital owners. Other things being equal, this
effect will generate a high level of labor income for low capital owners and a low level of labor
income for high capital owners. As a result, low level capital owners pays more taxes on average
than high level capital owners.
3 Conclusion
The initial motivation of this paper was to examine whether the social planner should emphasize
redistributive and social insurance aspects of inheritance taxation or incentive problems to in-
vestment by inheritance taxation. To do so, I developed a model of infinite horizon heterogenous
agents with asymmetric information. By using this framework, this paper shows that in the
case of quasi-linear preference the social planner will emphasize the negative incentive effects of
inheritance taxation rather than redistributive effects. This paper suggests that the relative size
of the curvature of utility functions with respect to consumption and labor, which are essentially
the elasticity of saving and labor supply, are important for designing an efficient intertemporal
tax system.
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